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From Syria to Sudan, governments have informal ties with militias that use violence against 
opposition groups and civilians. Building on research that suggests these groups offer 
governments logistical benefits in civil wars as well as political benefits in the form of reduced 
liability for violence, we provide the first systematic global analysis of the scale and patterns of 
these informal linkages. We find over 200 informal state-militia relationships across the globe, 
within but also outside of civil wars. We illustrate how informal delegation of violence to these 
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groups can help some governments avoid accountability for violence and repression. Our 
empirical analysis finds that weak democracies as well as recipients of financial aid from 
democracies are particularly likely to form informal ties with militias. This relationship is 
strengthened as the monitoring costs of democratic donors increases. Out-of-sample predictions 
illustrate the usefulness of our approach that views informal ties to militias as deliberate 
government strategy to avoid accountability. 
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During the Sudan civil war, reports alleged that government helicopter gunships dropped 
supplies in remote locations, not to supply uniformed government military personnel, but rather 
the armed gangs of the Janjaweed militia (Vasagar 2004). When questioned about its ties to the 
Janjaweed after the Darfur atrocities, the government claimed it was disarming not arming the 
group.1 Subsequent testimony from Janjaweed commanders explained the Sudanese 
government’s role in sponsoring and working with the militia in unofficial capacities, despite 
government denials (Meo 2008). In this article we examine the enduring attraction of armed non-
state actors for governments. 
A government clandestinely delivering weapons to groups outside the state security 
apparatus is at odds with the idea of consolidating a monopoly on violence. Despite the 
conventional view, there is no necessary process of monopolization (Staniland, forthcoming). 
Evidence suggests that armed groups, like the Janjaweed, often operate in vague and informal 
concert with the state. Yet with the exception of Ahram’s (2011a) analysis of data from the 
1970s, and Bates’ (2008) work on state failure in Africa, there is a lack of quantitative research 
in this area, while there is a rich case study literature for Latin America (Mazzei 2009; Stanley 
1996), Indonesia (Cribb 2001), Africa (Alvarez 2006; Kirschke 2000; Roessler 2005), and 
elsewhere (Campbell and Brenner 2000; Kalyvas 2008; Mitchell 2004).  
A new database includes global information from 1981 to 2007 on pro-government militias 
and defines informal relations between the government and a militia as those “not officially or 
formally acknowledged” by the government (Mitchell and Carey 2013, 11). There are 218 of 
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these relationships in over 60 countries (Carey, Mitchell and Lowe 2013).2 Militia-government 
cooperation is most likely in, but not limited to episodes of armed conflict, as 42% of our 
country-year observations with informal PGMs occur outside of armed conflict, using the 
threshold of 25 battle-related deaths (Gleditsch et al. 2002). These informal links can be found in 
a heterogeneous group of countries around the globe. They are present in poor states, such as 
Sudan and Haiti, and more developed states, such as South Africa and Chile, as well as in 
autocracies such as Zimbabwe and Burma, and in more democratic India, Spain, and Turkey.  
Why delegate violence to armed groups instead of using the official security apparatus? 
Why supply the Janjaweed when the Sudanese military itself lacked supplies?3 We identify 
logistical and political incentives for governments to informally collaborate with militias despite 
- and because of - the limited control they have over them (see also Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and 
Schubiger, forthcoming). As low cost force multipliers and with likely information advantages in 
insurgencies, there are logistical incentives to use these groups. Eck (forthcoming), using a fine-
grained sub-national analysis, explains delegation to militias as compensation for intelligence 
disruptions conditional on military purges and civil war threat. In addition, such delegation 
carries the political benefit of shifting responsibility (Fiorina 1985). Building on research on the 
influence of accountability on government repression (e.g. Landman 2005; Simmons 2009) and 
the case literature (e.g., Alvarez 1996; Kirschke 2000; Roessler 2005), we explain militias as an 
option for evading the accountability costs facing governments that are clearly responsible for 
official violence. If governments are sensitive to accountability costs attached to repression, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 These groups are common but not found in every country for there are costs to delegation and uncertainty about 
whether the task, in our case regime security, will be delivered (e.g., Mitnick 1980). Williamson highlights the 
hazard of contracting “sovereign transactions” (1999, 320) and incomplete control “can also invite the private 
provider to distort the mission to meet its own preference rather than those of the broad public” (Donahue and 
Zeckhauser 2011, 32). Governments likely consider the damage to reputation and the longer-term reliability of 
informal groups, including the prospect of betrayal.  
3 See “Country Profile: Sudan”, Library of Congress, December 2004, pg. 14, available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Sudan.pdf 
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unofficial links to militias offer a means to shift responsibility for violence: “these forces tend to 
be more ‘deniable’ and opaque than formal government security forces, allowing the state to 
avoid accountability” (Staniland 2012, 17). Beyond providing force, informational and 
deployment advantages to governments under the threat of civil violence, militias mitigate the 
risk of domestic and international liability for repression.4 After presenting the argument and 
some case examples, we move to the empirical analysis. Our results are consistent with the 
expectation that these linkages are a response to armed conflict and disorder. But beyond this 
disorder explanation, the results also support the argument that unofficial government-militia 
cooperation reflects strategic choices to reduce governments’ liability for repression. 
 
Militias and Accountability  
We assume governments may perceive important strategic benefits from the use of violence, if 
they can lower the perceived costs associated with its use. We know that even democratic 
governments are willing to violate human rights for strategic benefits, such as shifting unwanted 
civilian populations or ending a costly war and violent dissent (Downes 2006; Conrad and Moore 
2010). Rather than forego repression, governments may instead seek to evade accountability for 
it. 
We argue that governments perceive ties to militias as a mechanism to evade 
accountability and muddy the flow of information about who is responsible for violence. Recent 
work has shown that militias increase the risk of state-sponsored repression (Mitchell, Carey, and 
Butler 2014). Accountability has two major components: information and conditional sanctions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 These incentives fit Donahue and Zeckhauser’s (2011) production, information, and legitimacy motivations to 
delegate policy tasks to private actors, therefore uniting the security sector with other policy domains within a 
principal-agent approach.  
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(Grant and Keohane 2005, 30). First, accountability requires information on policies, such as 
repression, being available to citizens and the international community. Second, if there is 
evidence of wrongdoing, some punishment is expected to follow. These conditions, joint 
information and conditional punishment, help identify which countries are most likely to be held 
to account for violence, as well as which states might be best situated to use informal militias to 
reduce their liability. 
Accountability, both domestic and international, is central to understanding governments’ 
use of repression (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). We argue that governments seek to lower 
accountability for violence using the militia’s organizational separation from regular security 
forces. This separation increases the problems of delegation. It worsens the information 
asymmetries concerning the implementation of repression, enabling the government (as 
principal) to claim it cannot control the militias (as agent). The separation makes it more difficult 
for accountability holders to trace the responsibility for violence back to the government. This 
process is similar to what Fiorina (1985) described as delegation to “disguise.” Without being 
able to clearly establish responsibility for the violence, holding leaders to account, either by 
citizens or by the international community, is more difficult. This political incentive to use 
informal militias depends on the presence of domestic or international accountability 
mechanisms. 
If our understanding of the incentives for government repression and the perceived 
usefulness of militias in avoiding accountability is correct, then we should see informal links 
between governments and militias not just in isolated cases where governments have yet to 
achieve sovereignty, but in many places around the world where governments fear negative 
sanctions for the use of violence.  
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One might question the likely success of this form of avoiding accountability, particularly 
when open source and media accounts reveal these ties. Yet governments often operate with a 
minimal view of what is required for denials. “The point is not to persuade audiences to agree 
with the account—that is, to support the action—but to make it sound credible and reasonable” 
(Cohen 2001, 62). With regular forces on the border and available to invade or to interdict pro-
Russian militias, such as the Vostok Battalion operating in the Ukraine, and despite evidence in 
the worldwide media of their supply of these forces, the Russian government persisted in 
denying control over the Vostok Battalion: “ He [Putin] was trying to maintain an element of 
deniability, which he would be unable to do if he had sent regular Russian troops” (Judah 2014, 
77). Grant and Keohane make this point: “in world politics, accountability for most power-
wielders is likely to be less constraining than is optimal” (2005, 40). Even flimsy denials of 
responsibility for the activities of “rogue elements” in these groups may prove sufficient to create 
some reasonable doubt about the government’s accountability. 	  
 
Information, Government Sensitivity, and Reduced Liability 
Leaders’ sensitivity to accountability for using militias varies with the government’s ability to 
suppress information on links to militias, and with the conditional costs incurred if their 
responsibility were revealed. Governments may face domestic and international accountability 
mechanisms.  
Domestically, democratic leaders may expect to be punished for using violence since 
democratic institutions enable voters to sanction the government’s behavior with loss of public 
support or office. For example, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s approval rating dropped 
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10 points within months of cracking down on protesters in Istanbul in late May 2013 (Peter 
2013). Leaders in democracies may align with informal armed groups if they expect to shift 
responsibility for their actions. Informal linkages to militias might be quite easy for all 
governments to keep secret, since even full democracies have the power to keep official secrets 
(Colaresi 2014). However, in a full democracy with free speech and open information, secrecy is 
more difficult to maintain compared to incomplete democracies. This argument is in line with the 
finding that “full democracy” (Davenport and Armstrong 2004), reduces violations of human 
rights due to mechanisms of domestic accountability (Cingranelli and Filippov 2010). Bueno de 
Mesquita, Downs, Smith and Cherif argue “limited accountability generally retards 
improvements in human rights” (2005, 439). Governments in weak democracies are more likely 
to expect to be able reduce pressure to adhere to human rights standards by using militias to limit 
accountability: 
H1: Informal government-militia ties are more likely in weak democracies compared to 
full democracies or non-democracies. 
 
Leaders in strong autocracies have less fear of the domestic costs of official repression.  
Information asymmetries in autocracies are more severe than in other regime types. They are 
unlikely to have interest groups and “fire alarm” monitoring (Banks and Weingast 1992). 
Repression, even by the state security apparatus, may go unreported. If reported, it is usually 
very costly for citizens to sanction leaders. Where accountability mechanisms are absent, there is 
less incentive to use informal pro-government militias: 
H2: Informal government-militia ties are less likely in autocracies than in other regime 
types. 
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Research by Landman (2005) and others (e.g. Simmons 2009; Levitsky and Way 2010) 
extends the domestic logic of accountability to the international community. Leaders fear 
financial or even legal sanctions from external actors, whether other governments, international 
organizations, or courts. Democratic donor states and international organizations may punish 
leaders breaking human rights commitments (Landman 2005, Risse, Ropp, Sikkink 1999, 
Simmons 2009, Kirschke 2000, Roessler 2005, Levitsky and Way 2010). Leaders may fear the 
threat of legal action through international tribunals and financial sanctions from democratic 
donors (Simmons 2009, Kirschke 2000, Roessler 2005). Since the 1970s, the United States is 
required by law to consider the human rights performance of recipient states in aid decisions and 
the European Union’s commitment to human rights is considered fundamental to its external 
relations.5 For example, European Foreign Ministers threatened to delay talks about Turkey 
joining the EU after the May 2013 crack-down on protesters.6  
While Grant and Keohane (2005) caution that international monitoring is more difficult 
than domestic monitoring, developed democracies have used their financial leverage in an effort 
to protect human rights (Kirschke 2000, Roessler 2005, Levitsky and Way 2010). Research is 
mixed on the consistency with which aid sanctions are applied (Nielsen 2013), yet it is 
unnecessary to assume democratic aid donors are consistent or sincere in their commitments to 
human rights. If leaders aid human rights violating regimes, or even visit them (e.g., Prime 
Minister Cameron’s visit to Sri Lanka in 2013), they risk political or reputational costs. Aid 
sanctions and even selective application leave repressive regimes uncertain about the prospect of 
accountability, providing an incentive to seek to avoid accountability for repression. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  The EU’s “foreign policy instruments … and financial assistance help strengthen democracy and human rights in 
the world. Respect for human rights is also one of the preconditions for any candidate country's accession to the 
EU.” http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/human_rights_in_third_countries/index_en.htm 
6 “EU delays Turkey membership talks after German pressure” BBC World, June 25, 2013, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23044600. 
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Leaders in partial democracies and dependent on support from democracies have an 
incentive to outsource the use of violence to avoid reputational and tangible consequences for 
using repression.7 Consistent with case research (Kirschke 2000; Roessler 2005), we argue that 
governments dependent on aid from democracies are more likely to make use of militias to 
reduce liability for repression. An autocracy not reliant on support from democracies or fearful 
of other forms of intervention by the international community, such as the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War or North Korea today, has less fear of the costs of official repression. 
H3: Informal government-militia ties are more likely in states that receive aid from 
democracies, compared to states that do not receive aid from democracies or that receive 
aid from autocracies. 
 
Aid from democratic countries makes leaders vulnerable to conditional sanctions, 
providing the motivation to seek ties to informal armed groups. But only countries that expect to 
get away with this strategy will take this risk. In countries that are difficult for the international 
community to monitor, informal ties might escape notice. Since accountability relies on the joint 
combination of potential sanctions and information, we explore the possibility that the use of 
unofficial militias increases for recipients of democratic aid as the monitoring costs of the donors 
and the remoteness from donor democracies increases: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Nielsen (2013) points to the political costs for donors seen to support repressive regimes. For donor countries with 
strategic priorities, but with human rights constraints on aid policies, pointing to the recipient government’s 
incomplete control of those committing violence may provide some ‘credible if not persuasive’ defense of their 
support for repressive allies. Also, if democratic states refuse aid to countries that they expect in the future will 
utilize militias to repress their populations and avoid monitoring, then higher democratic aid should lower the 
probability of informal PGMs. The analysis controls for GDP and military strength, which might influence the 
likelihood of aid and of militia presence.  
 
11	  
	  
H4: Informal government-militia ties are more likely in states that receive aid from 
democracies but are difficult for donor democracies to monitor, compared to other types 
of states. 
 
Before testing these hypotheses on a global sample, some examples help illustrate the argument.  
   
CASE EXAMPLES OF INFORMAL TIES TO MILITIAS AND AVOIDING 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
The examples of Sudan and Bosnia illustrate the use of militias to avoid international sanctions 
for violence. The International Criminal Court (ICC) sought the arrest of the president of Sudan 
for the atrocities in Darfur carried out by armed militias. According to the ICC prosecutor, the 
president, although denying control over the militias, was criminally responsible for their acts: 
“They all report to him, they all obey him. His control is absolute” (ICC Press Release 2008).  In 
December 2014 the ICC prosecutor suspended the investigation,8 but if the president is ever 
arrested, he may take encouragement from the acquittal of Serbian officials for war crimes 
committed by Arkan’s Tigers.   
Serbian officials denied responsibility for this militia, but The Washington Post noted that 
“Milošević’s control is tight enough over Arkan’s units that they would not be operating on a 
free-lance basis” (Pomfret 1994; The Economist 14 October 1995). Despite the flimsy basis for 
denial, Serbian Security Service officials avoided accountability. The International Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia found that Serbian officials had aided the groups. But “it was not proven 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 “Sudan President Hails ‘Victory’ over ICC Charges” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-30467167. 
12	  
	  
beyond reasonable doubt that Stanišić or Simatović planned or ordered the crimes.”9  With a 
“credible if not persuasive” defense they were acquitted on all charges.   
In addition to legal liability for repression, militias may limit financial liability for aid 
dependent countries. In Cameroon, Rwanda, and Kenya, pressure from international aid donors 
to democratize, combined with pressure from internal opposition groups, led states to use 
informal repression “to avoid criticism by donors for human rights violations, but also to regain 
control over the transition process by covertly suppressing political conflicts” (Kirschke 2000, 
385). In 1991, the United States and other donor countries pressured President Moi into 
legalizing opposition parties and elections were held in 1992. But as in Rwanda and Cameroon, 
the government shifted to “informal repression, violations by surrogate bodies such as hit squads, 
party youth wings and traditional leaders, against perceived and real government critics” 
(Kirschke 2000, 397). Donor-induced democratization saw violence “carried out by nonstate 
actors, such as vigilantes, paramilitaries, and militias, who are directly or indirectly supported by 
the government” (Roessler 2005, 209). 
Governments collaborate with militias to shift blame and redirect the flow of information 
about responsibility for violations from regular to irregular forces. This is a joint or “collusive” 
relationship (Staniland forthcoming), not a “substitute” relationship where regular forces then 
“refrain” from violations (Cohen and Nordas forthcoming; Stanton forthcoming). The logic of 
delegation predicts increased violations and more agent-centered violations (e.g., sexual 
violence) where militias are present, and commensurate opportunities shift blame to these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 UN ICTY http://www.icty.org/sid/11329 
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groups, but not that regular forces desist from violations (Mitchell 2004).10 The logic also 
predicts high levels of agent-centered violations with similarly ill-disciplined or ill-motivated 
regular forces (e.g., Bohara et al. 2008). Examining sexual violence Brysk (2014, 6) says “the 
Congolese state … assert the problem is centered in militias rather than national forces,” but she 
highlights the responsibility of national forces as well as militias for these crimes. The Syrian 
government recruited the Shabiha militia from its prisons in 2011 to take the blame for atrocities 
(Sunday Telegraph March 23, 2014). But both regular forces and militias continued to commit 
violations according to the United Nations (2013). Publicity about government violations may 
bring tangible costs for countries in receipt of aid (Nielsen 2013), or it may make it easier to 
support the government’s opponents - a plausible concern of the Assad government and an 
incentive to outsource. 	  
These examples highlight the use of militias to reduce accountability. Across the cases, 
governments complicit in militia violence were at least partially successful in reducing the costs 
of being associated with excessive violence. The cases illustrate the complexity of accountability 
processes and the moral hazard of international aid or legal interventions, which might 
inadvertently create an incentive to use militias. 
 Before we empirically test our argument, we analyze the claim that militias offer 
logistical benefits to governments facing civil violence and disorder. Under such conditions, 
governments might use irregular armed groups as a quick and cost-effective way of deploying 
forces or gaining information advantages (Alvarez 2006; Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger 
forthcoming). In this “Disorder Model,” we analyze the impact of civil war and dissent on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 While lowering the costs of violence for governments, these groups also have their own agendas, and recruitment 
procedures are likely rudimentary. They attract violence-prone individuals (Alvarez 2006) to an organization that 
lacks discipline, training, and compensation to properly manage the delegation of violence. The motives of 
individual militia members may vary, and normative commitments are likely to impact the use of violence (Paper 7). 
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existence of informal government-militias links, controlling for level of development and 
population size. This model provides a benchmark to gauge the explanatory power of our 
accountability-avoidance mechanisms.  
 
Measuring Informal Government-Militia Ties 
We test our arguments using the Pro-Government Militias dataset (PGMD), containing 
information on whether an unofficial government-militia security tie existed in a given country-
year (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013). We focus on informal groups, which do not have an 
officially recognized or legal relationship with the government.11 The presence of informal 
government-militia ties is captured with a dummy variable with any informal government-
militia tie coded one and zero otherwise. Where there is no clear end date for this relationship, 
we use the last date of militia activity as proxy. 
Global data require concepts that travel cross-nationally and over time. Names of groups 
are culture-bound, vary regionally and over time, and are not a reliable indicator of a group’s 
properties. Campbell and Brenner (2000) include within the same analytical framework groups 
labeled death squads in Central America, vigilantes in the Philippines, paramilitaries in Serbia 
and Weimar Germany, militias and secret armies in India. An issue for future research raised by 
Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger (forthcoming) is how to classify sub-types of militias that 
hinge on theoretically important distinctions.12 
 
MEASURING THE INCENTIVES TO AVOID ACCOUNTABILITY 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For definitions and coding procedures, see Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe (2013). Since governments seek to hide 
links to militias, one concern is missing information. However, the sources used for historical coding back to 1981 
are greater than those available at the time. We use data until 2005 in this analysis. 
12 To illustrate we also ran analyses that dropped groups labeled “death squads” (English) from the analysis, shown 
in the appendix. 
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We measure the incentive and ability to avoid domestic accountability with political institutions. 
Strong Autocracies are coded as countries that score -7 or lower on the Polity2 scale (Marshall, 
Jaggers and Gurr, 2010). Weak Democracies are coded as countries that score between 1 and 6 
on that scale. Strong Democracies are coded as countries with the score 7 or above on the Polity2 
scale. The omitted category is weak autocracies. We also include the underlying Polity2 index, 
which ranges from -10 to 10 as a non-linear term in a generalized additive model to check 
whether a more flexible functional form provides evidence consistent with our hypotheses.13   
We measure international sensitivity with aid dependence, utilizing the AID 2.0 database 
to measure aid transactions. We code the purchasing-price parity adjusted value of aid sent from 
democracies (at least 7 on the Polity2 scale), to any recipient. We compute Democratic aid 
dependency as the natural log of the sum total of aid received from democracies as a proportion 
of the recipient’s GDP.14 To capture monitoring costs for the international community, we 
measure the distance (in kilometers) between each country and the nearest democracy. We 
follow Tobler’s law, which suggests “near things are more related than distant things,” and 
assume that informal government-militia partnerships that are distant from democracies will be 
more difficult to detect due to greater inattention or fewer resources. As human rights monitors 
specify, distance inhibits monitoring due to less dense informational ties that can reliably collect 
information.15 Distance to democracy is coded zero if the state is a democracy or a neighbor is a 
democracy, using the C-Shapes data (Weidmann and Gleditsch 2010), and then logged.16 We 
also explore whether proximity to a democracy and democratic aid interact to jointly make 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13As the GAM results make clear, small changes to the thresholds for the categories do not alter our inferences. 
14 When log-transforming the vector of aid scores we add one-half of the smallest, non-zero value, since they 
included zeros.  
15 See the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM), as well as the Norwegian 
Centre for Human Rights at the University of Oslo, “Manual on Human Right Monitoring,” Norwegian Resource 
Bank for Democracy and Human Rights, Chapter 6, pg. 7, available at 
http://www.jus.uio.no/smr/english/about/programmes/nordem/publications/manual/current/kap6.pdf. 
16 When log-transforming the distance to democracy scores we added one-half of the smallest, non-zero value. 
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informal government-militia ties more likely, given that if a regime does not depend on foreign 
aid from democracies, then the international community has less leverage, regardless of the 
distance to the nearest democracy. As distance may be an imperfect measure of monitoring costs, 
we use absence of media access (Norris 2008) as an alternative.17 This indicator is only available 
for a subset of our observations, but provides a useful validation of our inferences using distance 
to the nearest democracy. The results are presented in the appendix. 
 
THE EMPIRICAL LEVERAGE OF AUTOCRATIC AID 
Autocratic states are unlikely to be concerned about repression abroad. Therefore, aid from this 
source is unlikely to encourage recipient countries to outsource violence to militias. If 
democratic aid makes informal government-militia ties more likely, as expected, but autocratic 
aid does as well, then this would suggest that it is aid and not international monitoring by 
democracies that explains the use of PGMs. If, however, aid from democracies increases the 
presence of informal government-militia linkages, but not aid from autocracies, then this 
supports our conditional punishment argument. We therefore include Autocratic aid dependency 
in our specification.18 
 
ANALYZING THE DISORDER MODEL  
We first analyze the impact of domestic disorder on the probability of government-militia 
linkages. Then we compare whether our accountability model improves our understanding of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 We reverse the media scale to match the argument concerning monitoring costs. It should be more difficult to 
monitor a country with less media. The media scale equals the sum of per capita televisions, newspapers, radios, and 
internet users divided by four (Norris 2009, 3).The correlation between the distance to the nearest democracy and 
the absence of media scale is .49. The results are in the appendix and are consistent with the inferences using the 
distance measure.  
18 We control for the time since the last PGM presence using cubic splines in several specifications to measure 
potential non-linear deterministic trends in the probability of informal militia links. 
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use of militias. We measure disorder with current domestic unrest using the Cross-national 
Times Series (CNTS) data (Banks 2008) and code Strikes, Riots, Demonstrations, and Guerrilla 
attacks into a set of dichotomous variables. We measure civil violence and war with the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data (ACD) (Gleditsch et al., 2002), using Civil violence to 
measure armed conflict above the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths within one year and Civil 
war capturing civil wars that have crossed the 1,000 battle-related deaths threshold. Including 
both Civil violence and Civil war allows us to capture the effects of varying levels of violence 
within the disorder framework. Excluding one of these variables treats all non-civil war years as 
equal and assumes that civil violence and civil war have the same effect on government-militia 
linkages.19 We control for Economic development with the log of real GDP per capita from the 
Penn World Tables and for Population, which is logged and coded using the Correlates of War 
data, version 4.0 (Singer 1987). We also measure Ethnic fractionalization (Fearon and Laitin 
2003) to evaluate whether an ethnically more heterogeneous society increases the likelihood of 
government-militia collaboration. 
 When comparing our hypotheses with the Disorder Model we rely on generalized 
additive models to allow for flexible functional forms where appropriate, as well as a flexible 
interaction between aid from democracies and the distance to the nearest democracy. However, 
increasingly complicated specifications with greater flexibility are more likely to overfit the 
idiosyncrasies of the data. Therefore, we compare fits using AIC, which penalizes models with 
more parameters. To have a lower (thus better) AIC score, the added explanatory payoff must be 
greater than the added complexity. Additionally, we investigate out-of-sample fits between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 We explored whether constraining the coefficients for strikes, riots, and demonstrations and also civil violence 
and guerilla activity to be equal improved the model. It reduced the in-sample fit based on AIC and the forecasting 
performance. Therefore, we use the indicators separately. We conducted joint tests of significance to analyze 
whether we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for some or even all of the disorder coefficients are 
zero, or whether we can reject the hypothesis that they are all jointly zero.  
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Disorder Model and the Accountability Avoidance Model. A specification that is fitting 
idiosyncrasies in the sample data, rather than systematic patterns, will fit well in-sample but not 
out-of-sample. We use separation plots (Greenhill, Ward, and Sacks 2011) to present the out-of-
sample results and report Brier scores.20 
 
Results 
The first column in Table 1 presents the results of the baseline Disorder Model. Strikes, riots, 
demonstrations, guerrilla attacks, civil violence, and civil war increase the probability of an 
informal government-militia relationship within a country. However, it is only demonstrations, 
guerrilla attacks, and civil violence that have substantially larger point estimates compared to 
their associated standard errors.  
  While strikes, riots, and civil wars have smaller coefficients relative to their uncertainty 
estimates, this appears to be due to the covariance between these measures, as there is a similar 
bivariate relationship between these variables and informal government-militia ties compared to 
the bivariate relationship between riots and these unofficial ties. In addition, civil violence is 
present in all cases of civil war, so that the civil war parameter is measuring the difference 
between civil violence and war. These six variables are jointly statistically significant using a 
Wald test.21 We can reject the null hypothesis that the effect of strikes, demonstrations, and riots 
on PGM presences is jointly zero at the .01 level.22 Decreasing GDP also increases the 
probability of an informal government-militia tie, as does increasing the population size, likely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 We also explored whether having a smaller military might make informal PGMs more likely. Including the 
number of military personnel per capita did not alter our inferences; the results are presented in the appendix. We 
thank an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion.  
21 The test-statistic is 86.82, with six degrees of freedom and p < 0.001. 
22 The test-statistic is 21.41 with three degrees of freedom and p<0.001.  
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reflecting deployment efficiencies gained from militia ties. Our estimate for ethnic 
fractionalization is negative, with a standard error over three times the size of the point estimate.  
TABLE 1 A Logit Analysis of Informal Government-Militia Linkages  
 Model 1 
Disorder Model 
Model 2 
Accountability 
Avoidance 
Model 3  
Combined Model 
Disorder       
Strikes 0.38 (0.28)   0.28 (0.29) 
Riots 0.23 (0.24)   0.27 (0.25) 
Demonstrations 0.62** (0.22)   0.55* (0.23) 
Guerrilla attacks 0.50* (0.24)   0.29 (0.25) 
Civil violence 1.12*** (0.22)   1.14*** (0.22) 
Civil war 0.36 (0.32)   0.38 (0.34) 
Control variables       
Economic development -0.65*** (0.10)   -0.27* (0.14) 
Population 0.33*** (0.07)   0.33*** (0.07) 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.10 (0.32)   -0.09 (0.34) 
Domestic accountability       
Weak democracies   0.52** (0.20) 0.55* (0.22) 
Strong autocracies   -0.39 (0.28) 0.03 (0.29) 
Strong democracies   0.47 (0.32) 0.12 (0.38) 
International accountability       
Distance to democracy   0.19* (0.10) 0.15 (0.11) 
Aid from democracies   0.24*** (0.03) 0.16*** (0.04) 
Aid from autocracies   -0.09*** (0.02) -0.10*** (0.03) 
Intercept -1.86* (0.95) -5.70*** (0.65) -6.90*** (1.52) 
N 3270  3270  3270  
AIC 1038.2  1123.1  1002.6  
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .1, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed test) 
 
Substantively, the Disorder Model estimates how increasing the risk of disorder is likely 
to impact the probability of informal government-militia ties, irrespective of the incentive to 
avoid accountability. Moving from a low risk scenario where a country has a population and 
GDP per capita at the sample median and no riots, demonstrations, or other forms of civil 
violence, to a higher risk country with a population at the third quartile without increasing GDP 
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per capita proportionally23, and is suffering from civil violence, increases the probability of an 
informal government-militia from 2 percent (90% CI: .01 to .04) to 14 percent (90% CI: .08 to 
.22). These results support the argument that government-militia ties are more likely in situations 
of domestic disorder. As we show below, accounting for the risk of being held accountable for 
violence substantially improves the predictive power of our models.  
 
TABLE 2 Generalized Additive Analysis of Informal Government-Militia Linkages  
 Model 4 
1-D Smooth with 
Baseline 
Model 5 
2-D Smooth without 
Baseline  
Model 6  
2-D Smooth with 
Baseline 
Disorder       
Strikes 0.26 (0.29)   0.26 (0.29) 
Riots 0.24 (0.25)   0.27 (0.25) 
Demonstrations 0.53* (0.23)   0.48* (0.23) 
Guerrilla attacks 0.31 (0.25)   0.32 (0.26) 
Civil violence 1.21 (0.23)   1.17*** (0.23) 
Civil war 0.38 (0.33)   0.39 (0.33) 
Control variables       
Economic development -0.30* (0.14)   -0.44** (0.17) 
Population 0.34*** (0.08)   0.38*** (0.09) 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.04 (0.34)   -0.16 (0.35) 
International accountability       
Aid from autocracies -0.10*** (0.03) -0.10*** (0.02) -0.09*** (0.03) 
Intercept -5.82*** (1.30) -4.49*** (0.25) -4.93*** (1.36) 
       
Smooth Estimates EDF (Chi-sq) EDF (Chi-sq) EDF (Chi-sq) 
Aid from democracies 1.00** (9.48)     
Distance to nearest democracy 3.21* (9.78)     
Polity 4.27** (16.63) 4.08*** (21.25) 4.29** (16.46) 
Aid from Demo. & Dist. (2-D)   13.65*** (84.78) 11.02* (28.46) 
N 3270 3270 3270 
AIC 987.8 1093.7 987.2 
Standard errors in parentheses. Smooth estimates are non-linear relationships examined with a Chi-square test. EDF 
refers to the estimated degrees of freedom for the smooth term.* p < .1, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed test) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 As GDP remains constant, while the population increases, GDP per capita drops proportionally. 
21	  
	  
AVOIDING ACCOUNTABILITY 
To explore our argument that militias are more attractive in circumstance where leaders have 
incentives and opportunities to avoid accountability, the second and third set of columns in Table 
1 show the results from our Accountability Avoidance Model, with measures of regime type, the 
amount of aid from democracies, the distance to the nearest democracy, and aid from 
autocracies, alone (second column in Table 1) and in combination with the disorder measures 
(third column in Table 1), since we view these incentives as complementary. 
 
DOMESTIC ACCOUNTABILITY  
In each specification, we find support for the argument that governments use militias when they 
jointly have the incentive and ability to avoid accountability for violence. The results show that 
the probability of informal militia ties varies with regime type (see Table 1, columns 2 and 3, and 
Figure 1). A test that all of the regime categories have the same probability of informal militias is 
rejected at the .05 level for both models.  Further, with both specifications weak democracies 
have the highest probability of informal militia presence and autocracy (including the excluded 
weak autocracy category) lowers the probability of having an informal militia.24 These results 
provide evidence that weak democracies have a significantly higher probability of having 
informal militias, and that it is more difficult to differentiate the categories of strong autocracies, 
weak autocracies, and strong democracies.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Because this set of variables is categorical, we cannot interpret the raw coefficients as representing differences 
across all comparisons, but only against the baseline excluded category of weak autocracies. The positive coefficient 
for weak democracies represents the expectation that governments in weak democracies are more likely to have 
informal relationships with militias than weak autocracies. We can also test the equality of the estimated coefficients 
to see whether other differences are meaningful. Table 1, Model 2 shows that strong autocracies have a significantly 
lower probability of informal militias compared to weak democracies (Chi-square=9.9, df=1, p<.001) and strong 
democracies (Chi-square=5.2, df=1, p<0.025), but that the difference between weak democracies and strong 
democracies (Chi-square=0.02, df=1, p=0.87) may be due to chance in this specification. The GAM model presented 
below provides clearer evidence on this last point.  
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The analyses in Table 1 assume that the probability of informal government-militia 
relationships jumps across categories instead of smoothly varying with the underlying 
democracy index, and that we have a priori specified the jump locations correctly. This can be 
seen in the first panel of Figure 1, which plots the estimated probability of an informal militia 
and the 90 percent confidence interval from Model 2 in Table 1 for the 4 categories (strong 
autocracy, weak autocracy, weak democracy, and strong democracies) by the Polity2 scale that 
was used to create the categories. Each category is assumed to have a constant probability of a 
militia, while changes can only occur across categories. 
 
FIGURE 1. Probability of Unofficial Government-Militia Ties in Different Regime Types 
 
Table 2 estimates three generalized additive models that allow for flexible splines to fit 
the data to relax the assumption of linearity on the log odds scale for democracy and other 
variables of interest. We include the underlying Polity2 index as a continuous covariate without 
assuming a specific functional form for the relationship between regime types and the probability 
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of informal government-militia ties.25 Because these models no longer have only one parameter 
describing the change in the dependent variable, Table 2 presents the joint significance tests and 
estimated degrees of freedom for these non-linear relationships (smooth terms) and the AIC for 
each model, along with any linear terms that were included. The nonlinear relationships are best 
presented graphically. 
The second graph in Figure 1 plots the estimated relationship and standard error from the 
GAM in the second model in Table 2. The probability of an informal government-militia 
relationship rises steadily as autocracy decreases, peaking rather sharply between the weak 
democracy and strong democracy categories (near six and seven on the Polity2 scale), before 
dropping again as a state reaches full democracy. The AIC statistics across Table 2 suggest that 
the GAM specification is a better fit to the data even after penalizing the model for adding 
additional parameters. Only replacing the categorical regime variables in Model 3, Table 1 with 
the spline results in a reduction (improvement) of the AIC from 1002.6 to 995.1.  
In this model, weak democracies have three times the relative risk of informal 
government-militia ties compared to strong autocracies and 1.4 times the relative risk compared 
to strong democracies, consistent with hypotheses H1 and H2. As expected, states that are most 
likely to be held accountable for official repression, but might get away with using informal 
militias due to incomplete freedoms of speech and the press, are the most likely to have these 
ties. This nonlinear relationship is consistent across all three models in Table 3.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The models are fit using the package mgcv in R. The smooths are thin plate regression splines for the polity2 
score.  
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FIGURE 2. Predicted Probability of Unofficial Government-militia Linkages Depending 
on Aid Dependency by Donor’s Regime Type 
Note: Democratic aid is represented with a dotted white, autocratic aid with a solid black, with 90 percent 
confidence intervals. These results are for a country that is at the 75th percentile of distance.  
 
INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Our results support the argument that international accountability motivates the use of militias. 
Aid from democracies should increase the likelihood of ties to militias and the distance from the 
nearest democracy should increase the perceived ability to hide ties to militias. Aid from 
autocracies should decrease the likelihood of these ties since autocracies are unlikely to hold aid 
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recipients responsible for repression. Comparing the results from the linear26 specifications in 
Table 1 to the GAM results in Table 2 suggests that aid from democracies increases and aid from 
autocracies decreases the probability of government-militia ties.27 Thus, across different 
specifications H3 is supported. Figure 2 presents the differing slopes depending on whether the 
donor was a democracy or an autocracy, using the coefficients from Model 3, Table 2.28 The 
dotted white line with the accompanying darker confidence interval maps the non-linear but 
largely increasing relationship between democratic aid and informal militia ties for a state that is 
very distant from a democracy. The black line with lighter shaded confidence intervals maps the 
negative relationship between autocratic aid and the predicted probability of informal militia 
linkages. 
 Across the models, distance to the nearest democracy is estimated to increase the 
probability of informal ties, but the variability around this estimate suggests greater uncertainty 
about its additive effect. However, the best fitting model (Model 3, Table 2), by AIC, includes 
the non-linear interaction for aid from democracies and distance to the nearest democracy 
(Hypothesis 4), measuring cases that have both the incentive (keeping aid from democracies) and 
the opportunity (less precise monitoring due to distance from a democracy) to use a militia 
without suffering international accountability costs. The shape and significance of this 
interaction supports Hypothesis 4. Model 3 in Table 2 includes a two-dimensional tensor product 
smooth of distance and aid from democracies. The model can be thought of as suspending a 
flexible sheet, rather than a flat plane, through the data.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 These specifications are linear in the log odds. 
27 We attempted to fit smooth terms to the autocratic aid measure, but the linear model provided a superior fit based 
on AIC, and the smooth terms returned a linear functional form. 
28 This was calculated with the continuous covariates set at their mean and categorical variables set at their modes, 
with distance to the nearest democracy at the 90th percentile. The lines are only plotted over the range of the 
available sample data. The overlap of the confidence intervals is overstated because it does not take into account the 
covariance between the two parameters. Regardless, the different patterns are clear and the parameter differences 
bear this out (see Model 2 and Model 3 in Table 1 for a linear comparison).  
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The estimated relationship between democratic aid conditional on distance and the 
probability of an informal government-militia relationship is shown in Figure 3 in a wireframe 
and a contour plot. Both present the predicted probability for unofficial government-militia ties 
for a weak democracy with civil violence, median GDP, and population, based on Model 3 in 
Table 2. States that receive large amounts of aid from democracies and are far away from the 
nearest democracy are most likely to have informal government-militia ties. The estimated 
probability of such a tie increases from .2 (90% CI: .1 to .3) for a state that receives no aid from a 
democracy and shares a border with a democracy to over .8 (90% CI: .5 to .9) for a state that is 
over 1500 kilometers from the nearest democracy and receives aid from democracies at the 75th 
percentile.29  
 This plot also shows that the relationship between democratic aid and informal 
government-militia collaboration depends on the monitoring costs. Along the bottom edge of the 
contour plot the probability of informal militia-government rises only gently from .2 to .4 as aid 
increases. At the upper edge of the plot, for states that are distant from democracies, the 
probability increases from .3 to over .8. 
The lower AIC value for the combined models (3rd set of columns in Tables 1 and 2), 
compared either to the Disorder or the Accountability Avoidance Model, suggests that the 
disorder and accountability mechanisms are complementary; they are both useful for predicting 
informal militia relationships. The lower AIC value for the combined model that includes non-
linear terms (Model 3 in Table 2) compared to the linear model (Model 3 in Table 1) shows that 
the flexibility of the generalized additive model framework is helpful in predicting informal 
militia ties. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 These predicted probabilities are for a weak autocracy suffering current disorder, all other variables set at either 
their medians for continuous variables or modes for discretely valued measures. 
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Combining accountability avoidance with disorder measures substantively increases the 
probability of unofficial government-militia relationships. An autocracy with civil violence, but 
aid from other autocracies and not democracies, has only an expected one percent probability 
(90% CI: .01, .03) of having an informal militia relationship. However, a weak democracy, with 
the same degree of civil violence, getting aid from a distant democracy, has over an 80 percent 
risk (90% CI: .5, .9) of having such a relationship.  
 
 
FIGURE 3. Incentives and Opportunities for Unofficial Government-Militia Ties 
Note: Distance to democracy is measured in log km, and democratic aid as logged proportion of GDP, 
and response as the predicted probability of a PGM being present. The z-axis on the wireframe is scaled 
from 0-1. The other two axes are scaled from min to max. 
 
OUT OF SAMPLE PREDICTIONS 
 Despite the support for the Accountability Avoidance Model in combination with civil 
violence, our flexible model might be over-fitting idiosyncrasies in the sample data. Therefore, 
we use out-of-sample validation to further support our argument that it is not only domestic 
disorder and logistical concerns that motivate governments to use informal armed groups, but 
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also a logic of avoiding accountability. We first refit each model to the sample from 1981 to 
2001. Then we take the estimated coefficients and calculate predicted probabilities for the data 
from 2002 to 2005. If we are overfitting the sample data, the out-of-sample fit should be 
relatively poor. Figure 4 presents out-of-sample separation plots (Greenhill, Ward, and Sacks 
2011), which order the predicted probabilities from low to high values as one moves from left to 
right. For each prediction, a vertical red line is drawn if government-militia ties were present in 
the observed out-of-sample data, and a white line if not. If the model separated the observations 
of these ties perfectly, then the right side of the plot would be red and the left side white. A poor 
fitting model would have red lines towards the left of the panel, which represent observations 
with very low predicted probabilities from the model (since they are sorted on the left) but actual 
observed values where ties were in fact present (hence the red vertical line).  
The out-of-sample separation plot for the Disorder Model is relatively poor. It predicts 
informal government-militias linkages where none are observed in the data, indicated by the red 
lines towards the left of the plot area, although there is an increasing pattern of observed linkages 
as one moves towards the higher predicted probabilities on the right. In comparison, the out-of-
sample separation plot for model 3 from Table 2, which includes the Accountability Avoidance 
variables and models the potential nonlinear relationships, is visibly improved. There is 
considerable white space on the left, representing no informal government-militia relationships 
where the model does not expect them to be and an increasing density of red observed 
relationships on the right, where the model predicts a higher density of informal militia ties. The 
Brier scores for each model confirm the visual impression. The Disorder Model has a Brier score 
of .10, the model adding our measures and nonlinearities a Brier score of .03, where smaller 
scores imply a better fit between the predictions and the data. The Brier score for the combined 
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Accountability Avoidance Model is akin to predicting an informal government relationship with 
a militia with a probability of .82 and it then occurring.30 This is helpful evidence that our 
inclusion of additional variables and flexible functional forms did not over-fit the sample and 
forecasts well out-of-sample.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.  Separation Plots Comparing the Predicted Probability of Informal 
Government-Militia Ties with Out-of-Sample Observations Across Two 
Models. 
Note: The baseline model includes only the disorder variables, population, and GDP. The added model includes the 
variables in model 3 of Table 2. The models are fitted to data from 1981 to 2001 and validated on data after 2001. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The Brier score equals the mean of the squared distance between the predicted probability and the observed value. 
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  We also conducted several robustness tests that are detailed in the supporting 
information. To exclude the possibility that armed conflict drives our results, we excluded all 
countries from our sample with a civil war at any point during our observed time period. This did 
not alter our inferences, as there continued to be support for the hypothesized relationship 
between aid from democracies and informal government-militia ties, as well as between these 
links and weak democracy. Next, we included fixed effects for region, year, and then both region 
and year to the specification in Model 2, Table 1 as unobserved heterogeneity that might be 
correlated with our independent variables might drive our results. Again our inferences across 
the models remain robust. We also reran each model using only lagged independent variables 
and arrived at the same inference with slightly larger coefficients in absolute value.31 This leaves 
us with a picture of where governments are likely to collaborate with informal armed groups. It 
is not simply that governments use militias during civil disorder, but unofficial ties to militias 
appear in places where governments have some chance of avoiding accountability for their 
actions and an incentive to do so. 
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that there are political as well as logistical incentives to delegate violence to 
informal armed groups. Our theoretical framework specifies the conditions under which 
governments are most likely to try to avoid accountability by collaborating with militias. While 
research has shown that governments avoid using repression when they expect to be punished for 
the violence, we argue that governments not only decide between using or not using violence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 We also controlled for an alternative measure of ethnic fractionalization using the Ethnic Power Relations data. 
Our inferences continued to be robust to these changes. 
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Governments can also choose to shift responsibility for repression. Having ties to informal 
militias provides governments with plausible deniability for the violence they might commit.  
Clearly not all governments use militias. Loss of control or ‘shirking’ in this policy area 
has risks. Countries that expect to be punished for using violence and that are better placed to 
hide their ties with militias are most likely to use these groups. We measure the chance of getting 
away with delegating to militias with distance from the nearest democracy, as well as the 
absence of media access. The accountability cost for repression is operationalized with 
dependence on foreign aid from democracies. Our results show that governments that receive 
most aid from democratic donors and are also furthest away from democracies are most likely to 
have ties with militias. Using out-of-sample predictions further supports our finding that 
domestic disorder and civil war are only part of the reason for government-militias ties. While 
governments are more likely to establish links with informal armed groups during times of 
domestic conflict, governments’ incentives to avoid accountability for violence also play a 
crucial role.  
The policy implications for the international community are twofold.  First, this study 
highlights the need to anticipate unintended consequences of threatening to punish states for 
repression. Weak democracies appear to be using informal militias to avoid accountability for 
repression. Other work suggests that these informal ties to militias may make violence and 
human rights abuses worse (Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014). Second, to prevent government 
officials sheltering behind deniability claims, the government should be reminded of the 
responsibility to ensure compliance with international standards. Responsibility should be placed 
on the donor community to adopt as an explicit criterion in aid decisions a thorough assessment 
of the recipient’s security sector and the use or past use of militias. 
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More broadly, our study contributes a theoretically motivated global analysis of a 
neglected element of the security sector. As others have suggested, the monopoly of violence 
within a states is not a given (Ahram 2011a, 2011b; Staniland forthcoming). Under some 
circumstances states may prefer a majority position.  
This perspective raises questions for future research. What accounts for the supply of 
personnel for these groups and what role do different actors, such as parties, unions and regional 
power bases, play in inducing or encouraging the formation of informal militias? What effect do 
these groups have on the outcome of conflicts and on civilian welfare? What theoretically 
meaningful distinctions should be used to further disaggregate these groups? Finally, it is 
possible that further work on the incentives for informal militias can help solve remaining 
puzzles in understanding the contribution of militias to civilian welfare and regime security, as 
brought to the forefront in several contributions to this special issue (Cohen and Nordas 
forthcoming; Stanton forthcoming; Ahram 2011b). 
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